<-Threat Model Go to ToC Trust Establishment Protocol ->
1 Definition
The Verification Pipeline defines the ordered set of operations performed by a Trust Anchor to determine whether a Process Instance (PI) can be trusted within the MPAI‑PTF Trust Framework.
Based on the trust‑related data types defined in PTF (CII, credentials, evidence, policies, trust messages) it produces a Trust Response indicating whether the received messaged should be trusted.
The pipeline is deterministic, policy‑driven, and produces verifiable Trust Operations for auditability.
2 Objectives
The Verification Pipeline shall:
- Ascertain the trustability of the Requester by which the trust response has been solicited. This involved use of information that has been exchanged by the two parties “out of band”.
- Ensure the validity of the network identity of the Process Instance from which the message has been received.
- Validate the authentication credentials associated with the Process Instance from which the message has been received.
- Validate attestation evidence supporting the Process Instance’s claim of authorisation pertinence.
- Evaluate the evidence and policies governing trust decisions relating to the Requester.
- Produce a Trust Response indicating success or failure.
- Record Trust Operations for audit and traceability.
3 Inputs
The pipeline takes into consideration the following types of information:
- Cryptographic Instance Identity (CII)
- InstanceCredential
- ProcessLifecycleCredential
- AttestationEvidence
- PolicyBinding
- VerificationProfile (from Profile)
- TrustRequest (from Trust Message)
- Network Locality
4 Outputs
The pipeline produces:
- TrustResponse message
- TrustOperation records
- Optional logs for audit and compliance
5 Functional Requirements
The Verification Pipeline shall:
- Ingest the Trust Request
- Identify the requester.
- Validate the provenance and temporality of the trust message.
- Identify the requested trust operation.
- Load the applicable VerificationProfile.
- Verify the Cryptographic Instance Identity (CII)
- Validate structure and required fields.
- Verify signature using SAT algorithms.
- Check key validity and role consistency.
- Verify Credentials
- Validate InstanceCredential.
- Validate ProcessLifecycleCredential.
- Check validity intervals.
- Verify issuer signatures.
- Check credential chains if applicable.
- Verify Attestation Evidence
- Validate evidence type (SET).
- Verify hashes and signatures (SAT).
- Check freshness requirements.
- Check evidence completeness.
- Evaluate Policies
- Load PolicyBinding.
- Evaluate policy rules defined in the VerificationProfile.
- Check constraints, required attributes, and trust anchors.
- Aggregate Results
- Combine identity, credential, evidence, and policy outcomes.
- Apply VerificationProfile decision logic.
- Produce Trust Response
- Status: Success or Failure.
- Optional failure reason.
- Optional result payload.
- Record Trust Operations
- Log each verification step as a TrustOperation.
- Sign the Trust Response.
6 Processing Steps
The pipeline executes the following ordered steps:
Each step may produce intermediate Trust Operations for auditability. |
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7 Error Handling
The pipeline shall:
- Fail fast on malformed or unverifiable objects.
- Provide a clear failure reason in the Trust Response.
- Log all failures as TrustOperations.
- Never partially establish trust.
8 Security Considerations
The pipeline shall:
- Verify provenance
- Use SAT algorithms for all cryptographic verification.
- Reject weak or deprecated algorithms.
- Validate timestamps and freshness.
- Ensure policy evaluation cannot be bypassed.
- Protect TrustOperations and TrustResponses with signatures.
9 Conformance
A conforming Verifier shall:
- Implement all mandatory steps in the Verification Pipeline.
- Support all required PTF data types.
- Use SAT and SET taxonomies.
- Produce TrustOperations for each verification step.
- Produce a signed TrustResponse.
10 Cross Reference Table
Data Types Used in Each Verification Step
| Verification Step | Data Types Used | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Request Intake | TrustRequest, VerificationProfile | Identify operation, target, and applicable rules |
| Identity Verification | CryptographicInstanceIdentity (CII), SecurityAlgorithmTaxonomy | Verify identity, roles, and signatures |
| Credential Verification | InstanceCredential, ProcessLifecycleCredential, SecurityAlgorithmTaxonomy | Validate credentials, issuers, validity intervals |
| Evidence Verification | AttestationEvidence, SecurityEvidenceTaxonomy, SecurityAlgorithmTaxonomy | Verify evidence type, hash, signature, freshness |
| Policy Evaluation | PolicyBinding, VerificationProfile, TrustAnchor, CryptographicInstanceRoleTaxonomy | Evaluate trust rules and constraints |
| Decision Logic | All above | Aggregate results and determine trust outcome |
| Trust Response | TrustResponse, SecurityAlgorithmTaxonomy | Produce signed trust decision |
| Trust Operations Log | TrustOperation, TrustOperationTaxonomy | Record each verification step for auditability |
11 Bouts
A Bout (MPAI-AIF, Communication 9.1) is a Data Exchange given by a Controller or, on a boundary Input Port, by the holder of an Instance Credential issued by the Controller that receives it (a User Agent of MPAI-AIF, a Remote Client Application of MPAI-MAS); each of its instances is a Data Exchange too. The Data Exchange Metadata of a Bout Instance carries: Header; DataID; DataType; Source; and Security with Header, Identity (Issuer), Transmission (Protocol, and the Binding Data Type#Port Number@stamp/BoutID), Integrity (KeyID; the Signature where the instance is signed; the Hash where it is not), Freshness (Sequence) and, in a Chain, AuditChainHash. The Sequence of the first instance of a Bout is 1 and increases by 1.
H(x) is the SHA-256 of the canonical form of the instance x without Integrity.Signature, Integrity.Hash and AuditChainHash; an unsigned instance carries it in Integrity.Hash. A Signature is made, as every PTF Signature, over the canonical form of the object without its Signature, by the Controller, or the holder of the Instance Credential, that writes it. In a Chain, A(0) is the SHA-256 of the canonical form of the Bout without its Signature, A(k) = SHA-256(A(k−1) ‖ H(x(k))), the two 32-byte values concatenated, and the AuditChainHash of instance k is A(k); the instances whose Sequence is a multiple of ChainInterval, and the last before CloseBout, are signed.
11.1 AcceptBout
A receiver accepts a Bout after these checks, in this order; at the first that fails it refuses the Bout with the Error Code given.
| # | Check | Error Code |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | The Bout validates against the Bout schema of MPAI-AIF. | schemaViolation |
| 2 | Its Signature verifies with the key its KeyID names. | signatureFailure |
| 3 | The Controller that signed it is the one at the other end of the link, its credential and the anchor that issued it are valid, and the AIM its Source names may give the flow; or, on a boundary Input Port, its signer holds an Instance Credential that this Controller issued and has not revoked. | policyViolation |
| 4 | Its Binding names this Port – its Data Type and Port Number – and its stamp is fresh. | invalidValue |
| 5 | Its BoutID is in range and has not been used before, and its Dictionary is a Zstandard dictionary whose Dictionary_ID is the BoutID. | invalidValue |
| 6 | Its Method is Zstandard. | unsupportedAlgorithm |
| 7 | It is newer than the Bout in force on the Port, if any. | invalidValue |
| 8 | The policy allows the flow (EvaluatePolicy). | policyViolation |
When all pass, the Bout is in force on the Port from that time, and the Trace records the Trust Operation AcceptBout with the BoutID, the Port and the time.
11.2 VerifyChain
In a Chain, the receiver computes A(k) for each instance of a segment from the value of the signed instance before it, and accepts the instances of the segment when the signed instance that ends it verifies and its AuditChainHash equals the value computed. The Trace records VerifyChain with the range of Sequences verified. If an instance of the segment is missing, the instances of the segment are refused.
11.3 CloseBout
A Bout is closed by a Trust Message of type TrustRequest, with Request.Operation CloseBout, Request.TargetType AIF-BOU-V3.0 and Request.TargetID the BoutID, signed by the party that gave the Bout; its Data Exchange Metadata gives the last Sequence (Freshness.Sequence) and, in a Chain, the last AuditChainHash. The Controller closes the Bouts it gives also when the credential of their Source, or of the Controller at the other end, is revoked (RevokeCredential). A Controller that revokes an Instance Credential it issued closes the Bouts given to it with that credential. After CloseBout, the instances of the Bout are refused.
